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Abstract—In this paper, we use the hardness of quantization
over general lattices as the basis of developing a physical layer
secrecy system. Assuming that the channel state observed by
the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are distinct, this
asymmetry is used to develop a cryptosystem that resembles
the McEliece cryptosystem, designed to be implemented at the
physical layer. We ensure that the legitimate receiver observes
a specific lattice over which decoding is known to be possible
in polynomial-time. while the eavesdropper observes a lattice
over which decoding will prove to have the complexity of lattice
quantization over a general lattice1.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is and will remain one of the primary design
requirements in any communication system. Depending on the
nature of security desired, there are multiple means by which
secure communication is enabled [5], [6]. An increasingly
important means of securing communication is by exploiting
asymmetries (between the legitimate pair and the wiretapper)
at the physical layer. There are many schemes already in
existence designed to enable physical layer security [7], [5].
In general, there are two settings in which physical layer
security is conventionally studied: information-theoretic and
computational.
From the information-theoretic perspective, the Wyner wire-
tap model is the arguably one of the best studied secure-
communication models [2]. In this setting, the legitimate
transmitter (Alice) wishes to communicate a message W
to a legitimate receiver (Bob) through a noisy channel. An
eavesdropper (Eve) is present that can overhear the communi-
cation through another noisy medium. This wiretap model is
depicted in Figure 1. The notion of secrecy employed here is
typically that of perfect secrecy, i.e., the eavesdropper is not
assumed to be computationally bounded and we desire that
there is absolutely no leakage of information. However, the
results obtained using the Wyner wiretap model can be fairly
pessimistic - if the wiretapper has a “better” channel than the
legitimate receiver, the capacity of this model is zero.
Given the stringent nature of the information-theoretic per-
fect secrecy, the notion of computational secrecy (which forms
the basis of many cryptosystems) has received significant
attention [6]. Computational secrecy aims to create a com-
putational asymmetry in the system, enabling the legitimate
1This work was supported in part by a Brazilian national fellowship
receiver to determine the message at low complexity while
ensuring that it is exponentially complex for the eavesdropper
to do so. Indeed, a large number of secure systems deployed
today use a cryptosystem based on computational asymmetry.
However, a majority of these cryptosystems operate at layers
higher than the physical layer. Although mechanisms for
exploiting the physical layer for computational secrecy have
been studied ([7] and references therein), a not-so-uncommon
mindset is to use cryptosystems at higher layers and to assume
that perfect-secrecy is only relevant the physical layer.
In this paper, we utilize channel-asymmetry in enabling
computational secrecy at the physical layer using lattices. Our
approach is similar to that of a McEliece cryptosystem. A
McEliece cryptosystem is based on the difficulty of syndrome
decoding for a general linear codes, which is known to be
NP hard [4]. However, decoding of particular classes of codes
(such as BCH or Goppa) is known to be possible with low
complexity. Thus, a McEliece cryptosystem is designed so that
the legitimate receiver observes a very specific code while the
eavesdropper is faced with a general linear code. The McEliece
cryptosystem, however, does not use channel asymmetry as
its basis, and requires key exchanges making it is a higher
(network or application)-layer cryptosystem. This this paper,
we build a cryptosystem that does not require key exchanges
and is designed to operate at the physical layer. We use lattices
and the fact that lattice decoding of a general lattice is NP-
hard [8] to build this physical-layer cryptosystem. Indeed, the
shortest vector problem (SVP) in lattices has already been used
to develop cryptosystems [9]. However, these cryptosystems
typically operate at higher layers, and it is our goal to bring
this to the physical layer. In short, the main idea is to encode
Alice’s transmission such that Bob observes a lattice that is
easy to decode while Eve observes a general lattice over which
lattice quantization is exponentially hard.
Lattices for communication over additive Gaussian noise
(AGN) channels have already been studied in detail [10].
Elements from the ensemble of Construction-A lattices [11]
have been shown to be optimal for the AGN channel [13], [14].
However, general Construction-A lattices do not lend them-
selves to low complexity encoding and decoding algorithms.
Thus, specific lattice structures are now being studied to enable
lattice-based communication. One such effort is the design of
low density lattice codes (LDLCs) [15], while another is a
specific structured design of block-triangular Construction-A
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2lattices [12]. In this paper, we use one of these specific lattices
as the communication lattice to the legitimate receiver (Bob),
and “scrambling” it so a general lattice is observed at the
eavesdropper.
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Fig. 1. The channel model: X is the legitimate source while YB is the signal
observed by the legitimate receiver. YE is observed by the eavesdropper
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: the next
section presents the system model. Section II-B summarizes
some lattice preliminaries. In Section III, we present two
mechanisms for lattice-based computational secrecy - the
first based on simple channel inversion and the second on
channel diagonalization and inverse water-filling. Section IV
describes a particular lattice construction based on a block-
lower-triangular scheme as presented in [12], while Section V
concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A quick note on notation. For a matrix H , H−1 denotes
its inverse and Ht its transpose. Xn denotes an n× 1 vector.
Oftentimes, the vector Xn is abbreviated as X .
As mentioned in the introduction, the Wyner wiretap model
is considered in this paper. There is one transmitter, Alice,
that wishes to communicate with Bob. Eve is a wiretapper that
must be denied access to the information being transmitted.
The channel is an intersymbol interference (ISI) channel that
can be written in matrix form as
YB = HX +NB
where X is an n×1 vector formed by the signal transmitted
by Alice and YB is a n× 1 signal observed by the legitimate
receiver. H is an n×n matrix corresponding to the legitimate
channel. The channel is assumed to be fairly general, with
time-variation and/or ISI. Indeed, it is important that H not
be just a scaled version of the identity matrix2.
The channel over n time-instances to the eavesdropper is
given by
YE = GX +NE
2This paper utilizes the time-varying/ISI nature of the medium, and the
arguments do not hold if it is a constant channel.
where G is an n×n matrix that is independently generated
and thus distinct from H . To make this notion of independence
precise, a special case would be the case where the entries of
both H and G are drawn i.i.d. over a suitable distribution.
A. Assumptions
The main assumption is that the transmitter and legitimate
receiver know the channel transformation H . The fact that H
and G are two different matrices is the main asymmetry being
used in this design. H can be estimated in a wireless time
division duplex (TDD) setting by both the sender and receiver.
In a frequency division duplex (FDD) setting, a feedback
mechanism is needed to ensure that the channel estimate is
available to the transmitter. A couple of points:
1) G is not assumed to be known to either Alice or Bob.
Even the presence of an eavesdropper need not be known
to the legitimate pair. It suffices that G and H be
“sufficiently” different.
2) The channel state of the legitimate pair H can be known
to the eavesdropper, and even then the secrecy results
obtained are meaningful.
B. Lattice Preliminaries
A lattice Λ is a collection of vectors in Rn, of the form:
Λ = {λ = Gx, x ∈ Zn}
where Zn is the integer lattice, a collection of all integers
vectors of length n and G is an n × n real-valued matrix.
Let Ω denotes the fundamental Voronoi region of the lattice
Λ and V denotes the volume of Ω. There are two figures of
merits for lattice: The volume to noise ratio (VNR) and the
normalized second moment (NSM), whose definitions can be
found in [10]. The VNR measures a lattices suitability for
communication over AGN channels, while the NSM the same
for compression of Gaussian sources with a squared distortion
measure. Overall, “good” lattices with respect to both VNR
and NSM are known to exist. These “good” lattices, are also
known to achieve the capacity of an additive Gaussian noise
(AGN) channel are known to exist [14].
Next, we proceed to describing the physical-layer lattice
based cryptosystem envisioned in this paper. The lattices used
for communication may or may not be “good” for source or
channel coding. They will, however, be structured to ensure
efficient decoding and the legitimate receiver while making
decoding at the eavesdropper difficult.
III. LATTICE-BASED CRYPTOSYSTEM
The design of a lattice based cryptosystem can be attained
in a fairly straightforward manner, along the same lines as the
McEliece cryptosystem.
A. Channel Inversion
The simplest construction is when the matrix H is invert-
ible. In this construction, if Λ is a lattice that enables low
complexity encoding and decoding at the legitimate pair. Then,
the following policy is used:
3Encoding: map message m to a lattice point λ ∈ Λ. This
is possible due to the low-complexity nature of encoding
associated with Λ.
Transmission: Alice communicates
X = CH−1λ
where C is a suitable normalization constant so that the power
constraint at the transmitter is met.
Decoding: Bob observes Y nB = Cλ+NnB . Given the structure
of Λ, decoding this to recover λ and thus the message m is
possible with polynomial complexity.
Eavesdropper: The eavesdropper observes:
Y nE = CGH
−1λ+NnE
If G and H are independently generated with i.i.d. entries
over a continuous valued distribution, it is easy to verify that
the probability that GH−1 is a unitary matrix goes to zero as
n → ∞. This implies that the new lattice GH−1λ no longer
has the desired low-complexity structure and thus cannot be
decoded using polynomial-time algorithms. Note that, if H is
unknown to the eavesdropper, decoding is particularly difficult.
Even if H is known to the eavesdropper and G is invertible,
the eavesdropper can construct:
HG−1Y nE = Cλ+HG
−1NnE
Given that HG−1 is not unitary, such a transformation
would result in correlated noise at the eavesdropper with
covariance G−tHtHG−1, which is not a scaled version of an
identity matrix. As the lattice Λ’s Voronoi region is designed
to be decodable in the presence of white noise, decoding will
fail at the eavesdropper.
B. SVD and Inverse Water-filling
In general, however, H may not be an invertible matrix.
Moreover, channel inversion at the transmission is not a good
strategy in a communication system as it lowers the rates that
can be supported by the medium. A strategy that is somewhat
less naı¨ve is presented next:
Assuming the singular value decomposition (SVD) of the
channel matrix is given by:
H = UDV
where U and V are n × n unitary matrices and D is a
diagonal matrix comprised of its singular values. We assume
the diagonal values in D are arranged in decreasing order.
Given this, we can rewrite the received signal at Bob as:
Y nB = UDVX
n +NnE
through suitable unitary transformations, we can obtain:
Y˜ nB = U
tY nB = DX˜
n +NnE
where X˜n , V Xn . This process effectively diagonalizing
the legitimate channel. If we define a minimum threshold for
the channel gain t below which communication is feasible,
then D can be subdivided into the following form:
D =
[
D1 0
0 Dˆ
]
where Dˆ comprises of channel gains that are less than or
equal to t. If D˜ is a k×k matrix, then it is desirable that only
k dimensions be used for communication. A traditional wire-
less/multiple antenna communication system would treat these
k dimensions as independent parallel channels and waterfill
across them [16]. This approach is known to be optimal, but
the lattice-based secrecy benefits of such a scheme are unclear.
Instead, using the k parallel dimensions to communicate a
lattice vector makes them dependent. This dependence need
not always result in a lower rate, but it can lead to the physical-
layer lattice cryptosystem studied in this paper.
Encoding: A k-dimensional lattice point encoded using a
lattice which permits low-complexity encoding and decoding
is now used to communicate over the legitimate channel. This
k dimensional lattice can be obtained by truncating an existing
n dimensional lattice construction. This lattice point is then
enhanced to n dimensions by zero padding. This zero padded
lattice point is denoted by λ˜.
Transmission: Alice transmits
X = CV tD˜−1λ˜.
Here, D˜−1 equals
D˜−1 =
[
D1
−1 0
0 0
]
and C is the power normalization constant. Note that this
is, in essence, truncated inverse water-filling. Such a scheme
is definitely not optimal from the perspective of maximizing
rate for the legitimate channel. However, it ensures that the
structural properties of the lattice are maintained as it is
communicated across the legitimate channel.
Reception: Bob first constructs Y˜ nB from Y nB by multiplying
U t, and then uses the first k positions to determine the k-
dimensional lattice point being communicated. As the lattice
admits a low complexity decoding algorithm and is structured
to handle i.i.d. Gaussian noise, this decoding is successful with
high probability.
Eavesdropper: The eavesdropper, as before, observes a gen-
eral lattice given by:
YE = CGV
tD˜−1λ˜+NE
with no particular relationship between H and G, this lattice
is a general one. Even the knowledge of the encoding strategy
and H does not help, as any linear processing will result in
colored noise at the receiver.
Note that both the schemes presented here relied on the
assumption that neither H nor G are a multiple of identity,
i.e. constant channels. In essence, channel variation and inter-
symbol interference are being used to instill an asymmetry
between the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper, which is
essential to the analysis. Moreover, this analysis lends itself
naturally to multiple antenna channels as well. In the multiple
antenna context, both static and varying channels are of inter-
est, and this scheme is applicable to either of these settings.
4IV. CONSTRUCTION OF LATTICES THAT PERMIT
EFFICIENT ENCODING AND DECODING
As mentioned earlier, the family of low density lattice codes
(LDLCs) in [15] is one example of lattices that can be used
for this lattice-based cryptosystem. Here, we summarize an
alternate scheme developed in [12]. Note that this serves as a
summary of the unpublished work in [12] only, and is not an
original contribution by the authors of this paper.
This construction of the class of lattices in [12] is based
on the Construction-A framework [11]. The ensemble of
Construction-A lattices is known to contain lattices that are
good for source and channel coding [10]. Hence, this class
of lattices is of particular interest to us. Unfortunately, a
randomly chosen Construction-A lattice does not afford ei-
ther low-complexity encoding or decoding. Thus, a specific
construction is required to enable low complexity processing.
In general, Construction-A lattices are of the form:
Λ = p−1GZkp + Zn
where G is an n × k “generator” matrix, Zkp is the set of
all k-length vectors modulo p and the multiplication between
G and Zkp is defined modulo p. All other operations are over
the real field.
This construction is based on the understanding that a short
block length is sufficient for realizing shaping gain, while
longer block lengths are required to achieve coding gain.
Thus, the Construction-A parity check matrix for this lattice
is structured as follows:
F =

K 0 . . . 0
A21 K . . . 0
...
...
...
...
Al1 Al2 . . . K

In short, the parity-check matrix is chosen to be block
lower triangular. Here K is a suitable “small” parity check
matrix that provides shaping gain. For example, it could be
the parity check matrix corresponding to the Leech lattice, or
one corresponding to a low-density generator matrix (LDGM)
code. Its sole purpose is to enable, within a dimension of a
few tens, for much of the shaping gain to be captured. Aij
are, on the other hand, chosen to be matrices such that the
overall parity check matrix F is “good” from the perspective
of coding gain.
Encoding for this lattice proceeds as follows: a vector X is
determined that solves the equation
FX =
[
0
m
]
where m is the message to be communicated. Note that this
encoding procedure can result in multiple solutions for X in
Rn. Thus, our interest is in determining that solution which is
closest to the origin. In general, solving for a vector closest to
the origin in a lattice is an NP-hard problem. However, given
the structure of the lattice, this can be solved recursively. By
breaking X into l parts:
Xt = [Xt1 X
t
2 . . . X
t
l ]
and solving consecutive equations of the form:
KXi =
[
0
mi
]
where the closest vector problem is now reduced to one
over a much smaller scale than the original problem.
Decoding proceeds using conventional mechanisms in non-
binary low density parity check (LDPC) codes. If Aij are
chosen in a manner to render the code a good LDPC, a belief
propagation algorithm can be used for decoding.
This concludes the summary of this particular construction.
Multiple other constructions exist and are being actively
researched to enable lattice-based communication, and such
constructions can be used in this cyptosystem as well as non-
trivial linearly transformed versions of these lattices result in
general lattices over which decoding is hard.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper builds a physical-layer based cryptosystem using
the hardness of lattice quantization of generalized lattices. This
scheme uses no key, either public or private. It uses the chan-
nel channel asymmetry between the legitimate pair and the
eavesdropper in developing the scheme. Although analytically
simple in design, this scheme is a natural application of lattices
to both communication and secrecy.
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